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Summary 
Tropical deforestation is one of the major sources of carbon emissions, but the Kyoto Protocol 
presently excludes avoiding these specific emissions to fulfill stabilization targets. Since the 13th 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 2007, where the need for policy incentives for 
the reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) was first officially 
recognized, the focus of this debate has shifted to issues of implementation and methodology. One 
question is how REDD would be financed, which could be solved by integrating REDD credits into 
existing carbon markets. However, concern has been voiced regarding the effects that the 
availability of cheap REDD credits might have on energy investments and the development of clean 
technology. On the other hand, investors and producers are also worried that emissions trading 
schemes like the one installed in Europe might deter investment into new technologies and harm 
profits of existing plants due to fluctuations in the price of emissions permits. This paper seeks to 
contribute to this discussion by developing a real options model, where there is an option to invest 
in less carbon-intensive energy technology and an option to purchase credits on REDD, which you 
will exercise or not depending on the future evolution of CO2 prices. In this way, unresolved 
questions can still be addressed at a later stage, while producers and investors hold REDD options 
to maintain flexibility for later decisions. We find that investment in cleaner technology is not 
significantly affected if REDD options are priced as a derivative of CO2 permits. Indeed, the 
availability of REDD options helps to smooth out price fluctuations that might arise from permit 
trading and thus decreases risk for the producer - thereby being a complement to permit trading 
rather than an obstacle undermining cap-and-trade. 
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Tropical deforestation is one of the major sources of carbon emissions, but the Kyoto 
Protocol presently excludes avoiding these specific emissions to fulfil stabilization 
targets. Since the 13
th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 2007, where 
the need for policy incentives for the reduction of emissions from deforestation and 
degradation (REDD) was first officially recognized, the focus of this debate has shifted to 
issues of implementation and methodology. One question is how REDD would be 
financed, which could be solved by integrating REDD credits into existing carbon 
markets. However, concern has been voiced regarding the effects that the availability of 
cheap REDD credits might have on energy investments and the development of clean 
technology. On the other hand, investors and producers are also worried that emissions 
trading schemes like the one installed in Europe might deter investment into new 
technologies and harm profits of existing plants due to fluctuations in the price of 
emissions permits. This paper seeks to contribute to this discussion by developing a real 
options model, where there is an option to invest in less carbon-intensive energy 
technology and an option to purchase credits on REDD, which you will exercise or not 
depending on the future evolution of CO2 prices. In this way, unresolved questions can 
still be addressed at a later stage, while producers and investors hold REDD options to 
maintain flexibility for later decisions. We find that investment in cleaner technology is 
not significantly affected if REDD options are priced as a derivative of CO2 permits. 
Indeed, the availability of REDD options helps to smooth out price fluctuations that 
might arise from permit trading and thus decreases risk for the producer - thereby being a 
complement to permit trading rather than an obstacle undermining cap-and-trade.  
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1 Introduction 
 
With up to 20% the estimates of emissions arising from deforestation each year amount 
to one of the major sources of anthropogenic GHG emissions. This percentage even 
outstrips that of emissions from transportation. The Eliasch Review (2008) estimates that 
by 2100 the economic cost due to deforestation could be around $1 trillion per year; 
achieving stabilization at concentrations keeping warming below 2°C would be 
impossible if deforestation continued at the current pace. The question arises why the 
Kyoto Protocol was not designed to account for deforestation emissions. This had mainly 
to do with the fear of negotiators - at the time when the Protocol was ratified - that cheap 
credits granted for avoided deforestation could flood the market, thus driving down the 
price for carbon allowances and thereby undermining the effectiveness of cap-and-trade 
by e.g. destroying the incentives to develop, test and install modern, less carbon-intensive 
technology. Even though the need to include REDD into international agreements was 
identified as soon as COP9, however, it was only last year, at COP13, when this was 
officially recognized. In addition, many additional benefits have been emphasized: for 
example, compliance costs will be lower if REDD is included in the next agreement, so 
an even more ambitious target could be achieved at a comparatively lower cost provided 
REDD is included in global carbon markets (Eliasch Review, 2008).
1  
  In this paper we are concerned with finding a way of implementing REDD and 
investigating its potential effects on energy investments. In addition, we aim to shed 
some light on the debate whether REDD should be integrated into carbon markets and 
whether it complements or undermines cap-and-trade. The latter has been opposed by 
stakeholders and decision-makers in many countries due to the instability of CO2 prices 
that are associated with new, immature markets, which are also influenced by policy 
uncertainty. Such price volatility could, for instance, be observed when the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) started. We find that the inclusion of REDD into 
existing carbon markets can help to smooth out such fluctuations, thereby reducing the 
risks that producers might be exposed to. 
For the analysis of these problems we design a real options model. Real options 
are a suitable tool to assess investment decisions under uncertainty when there is 
irreversibility involved and the investors enjoys a certain degree of flexibility with 
respect to his actions (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The basic idea is that it pays off 
to wait for the arrival of more information in the face of uncertainty if a large amount of 
resources has to be committed to a project. In the case of an energy investor, a less 
carbon-intensive power plant or equipment designed to mitigate the emissions due to 
combustion, require such an irreversible investment. On the other hand, deforestation also 
represents an irreversible decision. As will be seen in the analysis, preserving flexibility 
by not deforesting has an economic value, even if some methodological issues with 
respect to REDD remain uncertain in the near future. 
                                                 
1 Other additional benefits of REDD include that global emissions can be curbed, while excluding REDD 
would imply a focus on the reduction of fossil fuel combustion: under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), avoided deforestation does not lead to a decrease in global emissions, but simply to a “shift” of 
emissions from developing to developed countries (see e.g. Schwartzman et al, 2008). Furthermore, 
biodiversity will be preserved, rural development facilitated and poverty reduced.   - 2 -
  The real options model used in this paper focuses on a coal-fired power plant, 
which can be retrofitted with a carbon capture and storage module (CCS), which will 
reduce a major part of the emissions generated by the combustion of coal in the power 
plant. The CCS module is therefore an example of a carbon-saving investment, which is 
suspected to be negatively affected by the availability of REDD credits. Purchasing 
REDD options is another way of offsetting emissions from the combustion of coal. In our 
framework, they will be purchased at an option price: whether the REDD option will be 
exercised or not depends on the realization of CO2 prices ex post. For all emissions not 
offset or captured, permits must be purchased at the current ETS price in € per ton of CO2 
in each respective year. In summary, there are thus two decisions to be made on a yearly 
basis: (a) the number of REDD options to be purchased in the beginning of the planning 
period and exercised at a later point in time, and (b) the timing of the adoption of the 
CCS module. CO2 permit prices follow a stochastic process, where the volatility is 
estimated from the spread of CO2 price scenarios in the future. REDD options are priced 
as derivatives of permits, but we also compare outcomes for lower option prices as e.g. 
derived from carbon supply curves for global forests and other land uses (e.g. Sedjo et al, 
2001). We find that the pricing of REDD is crucial in determining its impact on CCS 
investment and that integrating it in global carbon markets would ensure high enough a 
price to avoid such negative effects that are suspected to materialize by opponents of 
REDD. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section explains the basic 
ideas of real options modeling and sets it into the context of permit trading and REDD, 
affecting a representative coal-fired power plant owner. Section 3 provides a detailed 
description of the model, the data used and the pricing mechanism applied to the 
valuation of the REDD options. The fourth section presents the results and discusses the 
implications for future carbon markets. Finally, section 5 concludes and extracts 
recommendations for policy-makers from the analysis previously conducted.  
 
 
2 Real Options, Permit Trading & REDD 
 
While options theory has long been established in finance, real options are a relatively 
new concept, where the opportunity to invest into a “real”, non-financial asset is 
considered as an option or, in other words, as the right, but not an obligation, to commit 
resources to the project at a future point in time. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
amongst others, real options modeling is a suitable framework to analyze investments 
under uncertainty, which involve irreversibility with respect to the resources spent (most 
often large costs in terms of capital) and flexibility to postpone the project on behalf of 
the investor. In contrast to “standard” Net Present Value (NPV) investment rules, real 
options can take into account the value of waiting for more information to be revealed; 
the investor can thus base the optimal decision on the value of immediate profits seized 
from an investment and the value of investing at a later point in time, where the latter is 
often called the option value of the investment. 
The basic idea behind real options is that it takes into account the flexibility of the 
investor to act later when he can make different decisions for different outcomes of the   - 3 -
uncertain factors. It has found many applications to investment problems (see e.g. 
Pindyck (1993) for an early application to sequential investment).  
  In energy planning, real options have been used in many theoretical applications 
already (e.g. Reinelt and Keith, 2007), even though energy companies, in practice, have 
usually not been relying on real options valuations of their projects yet. Related to the 
topic of permit trading and the vulnerability of producers’ profits to permit price 
fluctuations, Szolgayova et al (2008) use a real options model to investigate the impact of 
a price cap, which has been suggested as a form of protection against upward price spikes 
for power plant operators. The authors find that a too low price cap depresses investment 
into less carbon-intensive technologies and benefits companies with high emissions 
asymmetrically: similar protection is not provided for the owners of clean technology 
through e.g. a permit price floor.  
In this paper we seek to suggest an alternative instrument to assist producers in 
hedging their risks: the integration of REDD options in an existing carbon market. We 
find that this combination of instruments (permit trading and REDD) can indeed help to 
smooth out fluctuations in profits and thus reduce the investor’s exposure to risk. This 
shows that the provision of REDD options represents additional flexibility to the investor, 
the value of which depends on the development of CO2 prices.  
In addition, there is also a value to preserving forests, as deforestation is an 
irreversibility in itself and destroys the value of flexibility that REDD options imply. In 
other words, keeping the REDD potential open has an option value of its own account. 
Finally, but related to the previous point, we want to address the question of the timing of 
adopting REDD and the design of the underlying mechanisms. To date, there are still 
many unresolved issues (REDD mechanisms, climate sensitivity, REDD potential, etc) 
and also political difficulties (commitment of different countries) with respect to 
implementation. However, our suggestions point to the usefulness of going ahead with 
REDD already at this stage, even if many issues are not solved yet and many 
technicalities remain unclear at the moment. The reason for this is that the exertion of the 
REDD options will have to be decided upon in the future and not now, so the payment in 
terms of the option price has to made today, but it is low compared to the strike price and 
the price of CO2 permits. So, even if some problems can only be resolved in the future, it 
is still possible to act optimally and with access to better information later. Furthermore, 




3 Modeling REDD & CCS Options 
 
3.1 Model Description & Methodology 
 
The model derived in this section includes a real investment option and an option on 
REDD. The first option refers to investment into mitigation technology. In our specific 
case, we consider the option to retrofit an existing coal-fired power plant with a carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) module. The REDD option is an additional way of offsetting 
CO2 emissions. The difficulty lies in determining the price of such an option and 
including it into the same framework as the real option, so that one option is valued in the   - 4 -
presence of the other. In this way, we can determine the impact of the availability of 
REDD options on mitigation technology. 
Let us now explain the model structure in detail and derive the mathematical 
formulation of the problem. The planning horizon of the model is 50 years, which is 
equal to the considered power plant’s lifetime. The producer (or planner) owns a coal-
fired power plant, which can be retrofitted to include a CCS module. Adding this module, 
which will capture part of the emitted CO2, becomes more attractive as CO2 permit prices 
rise. At the same time, CO2 prices are volatile and the cost of installing the module is 
relatively high and will be sunk ex post. There is therefore a certain degree of investment 
irreversibility involved in the problem, which makes real options theory a suitable 
approach to finding the optimal timing of investment. Looking at the shadow prices for 
GHG emissions in the GGI scenarios (IIASA, 2007), there is a clear upward trend at 
around 5% and the spread of those paths across scenarios points to a positive value for 
the volatility as well.
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where μ  is the drift parameter, 
c σ  is the annualized volatility parameter and 
c
t dW  is the 
increment of a Wiener process.  
Including the REDD option into the same valuation framework implies that the 
decision-maker can actually hedge some of the CO2 price uncertainty by purchasing the 
right, but not the obligation, to offset the CO2 emissions created by exercising the option 
and therefore receiving a “credit” for CO2 savings due to avoided deforestation projects, 
for example. More precisely, we consider REDD credits as options, i.e. as a right but not 
an obligation to offset 1 ton of CO2 at any time now or in the future for a given strike 
price E. This means the option can be represented as an American call option on the CO2 
price. Since the price of an American call option for an asset without dividends is the 
same as the price of a European call option, we can use the Black and Scholes formula 
(Black and Scholes, 1973) to price REDD options as derivatives of CO2 permits, the price 










0 P  is the “stock” price, which is equal to the initial CO2 permit price here, E is the 
strike price, which we set at 15$/ton. N refers to a normal distribution, σ
c denotes the 
volatility parameter, which we will vary according to the experimental setup later on. T is 
50 years, and  REDD P  is the option price to be determined (in $/ton). 
                                                 
2 See Section 3.2 for more information on the calibration of these parameters and the actual data. 
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Now that we have specified the two different ways of offsetting CO2 (investing in 
CCS or exercising REDD options) and their specific costs, let us turn to some other cost 
items, which are deterministic in this setting, but whose level can still influence the 
optimal investment plan. The cost of both capital and operations and maintenance 
(O&M) is constant and deterministic, which abstracts from possible capital-saving 
technical change. We also ignore stochasticity in coal prices for now.  
The investor has an installed coal-fired power plant at his disposal and needs to 
decide whether and when to add the CCS module, since it can be worthwhile to postpone 
installation and buy REDD options to offset emissions. The decision whether to install 
the CCS module can be taken on a yearly basis, whereas the REDD options can be 
bought only in the first year. The investor wants to maximize the sum of discounted 
expected future profits. The yearly profit π consists of the revenues from selling 
electricity less the cost of fuel, CO2-related expenses,
3 annual O&M, and costs associated 
with the installation of the CCS module. CO2-related expenses depend on the existence of 
the CCS module and on the action performed that year. The actions available each year to 
the investor are either to add the CCS module (if it has not been installed yet), exercise 
the REDD options (if there are any available) or to do nothing. The action each year will 
be different for different states and prices realized that year. 
Let t x  denote the state that the system is currently in at time t, i.e. whether the 
CCS module has or has not been built so far. As already pointed out above,  t a  is the 
control variable. Let us denote N the number of REDD options purchased in the first year 
and  t n   the number of options currently available to the investor at time t.  As  1 t x +  
depends only on the current values of action and state,  1 t x +  is a function of   t x  and  t a , 
and similarly  1 t n + is a function of  t n and  t a . The yearly profits are thus 
 





f e e c
t t t 1 − − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = π  
 
in the first year, and 
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in any other year, where 
f P  is the price of coal and OC is the operational cost per year. 
Note that OC also includes the costs of transporting and storing the captured CO2. The q 
refer to annual quantities of electricity, fuel and CO2 respectively. c(at) is the cost of an 
action; for example the cost of installing the CCS module or the costs of exercising 
REDD options.  REDD P  is the price for one REDD option. In the case where the CCS 
module has already been built, exercising the REDD options will offset more emissions 
than necessary. In that case the producer is able to retrieve what was paid in excess. Note 
                                                 
3 These include the payments for permits needed to be purchased for all emissions that are not offset by 
REDD or captured through the CCS-module. Not included are expenses for REDD options or the CCS-
module, which are already accounted for by other cost items (investment cost,  ) t a ( c , O&M cost, 
) t x ( OC , and costs for purchasing REDD options,  REDD P N ⋅ ). 
(3)   - 6 -
that exercising a REDD option will reduce 
c q  to zero for that year and that the only other 
way to decrease 
c q  is to install CCS.  
The investor’s problem is to determine the optimal number of REDD options N, 
and the optimal investment strategies
T
1 t t} a { = , where the optimal decision in each year 






where nt stands for the number of REDD options, xt is the state,
4 at the action
5 undertaken 
at time t and At the set of feasible actions the investor/producer can choose from. r is the 
discount rate. This is a standard Bellman function, in which the first part of the value to 
be maximized is the immediate profits one would obtain upon installation of the CCS 
module, while the second part of the sum is the so-called continuation value, which takes 
into account the values when the investment option is exercised in the future (i.e. 
currently postponed), given today’s prices. Furthermore, it includes the optimal amount 
of REDD options to be bought in the beginning of the planning period and actively 
considers into account that they can be exercised (at the strike price) to offset emissions 
at any later point in time.   
We choose a combination of dynamic programming and Monte Carlo simulation 
in order to determine the optimal actions. The methodology first requires us to fix the 
terminal condition, in our case this is VT=0, where T is the last year of the planning 
horizon. We then continue to compute the optimal actions, a, for all possible states, x, and 
prices, P
c, recursively. This endows us with a strategy for all possible circumstances and 
price realizations in terms of the optimal action, which will maximize the value function 
in Equation (3) accordingly. Since we are interested to learn about the frequency 
distributions (or the probabilities if one prefers this interpretation) with which these 
actions are exercised for a given price process, we simulate a large number of price paths 
and pick the optimal actions for each realization from the previously derived strategy. In 
this way, we can not only determine the frequency with which the CCS option is 
exercised and when, but also the optimal amount of REDD options to be bought and 
when they will be exercised.
6 
 
3.2 Data: Technology Costs & CO2 Prices 
 
Table 1 lists the data that have been used in the analysis. They have been gathered from 
the International Energy Agency’s survey on power plants in 2005 and its technological 
outlook from 2006. The technology focused on is an Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle Plant (IGCC), which is more modern than many existing, standard pulverized coal-
                                                 
4 Has the CCS module been built or not? Have the offset options been exercised? 
5 The actions that can be undertaken are the following: a=0 ⇒ do nothing; a=1 ⇒ exercise REDD option; 
a=2 ⇒ exercise (real) CCS investment option. 
6 For a more detailed description of the methodology, the reader is referred to the appendix or Fuss et al 
(2008). 
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fired power plants and which will be more interesting for new installations, since it has 
higher conversion efficiency. This implies that this technology uses less coal and 
generates fewer emissions at the same time, which will be an advantage in the light of 
rising CO2 prices. Retrofitting the IGCC plant with a CCS module requires an additional 
outlay in terms of capital costs, but also the efficiency of the plant will be lower and so 
the yearly output for the same amount of inputs will be lower as well. Operations and 
maintenance costs (O&M) will be higher for the plant including CCS, obviously. This 
has also to do with the fact that the CO2 does not only need to be captured, but it also 
needs to be transported to a suitable site, where it can be stored. However, the savings in 
terms of CO2 are large and a sufficiently high CO2 price level can provide an incentive 
for CCS investment.  
 
 
   IGCC Add-on  CCS 
Capital cost (US$/kW)  1,373.00  343.00 
Fuel cost (US$ per GJheat LHV)  2.06  2.06 
Conversion efficiency ( LHV)  0.50  0.44 
CO2 emissions (ton CO2 per yr/kW)  4.77  0.48 
CO2 storage cost (US$/ton CO2)  NA  5.45 
Capacity factor  0.75  0.75 
O&M (US$ per yr/kW)  92.09  124.16 
Electricity generation  (kWh/yr) 6,570.00 5,781.60 
Table 1: Technology Data (Source: IEA, 2005, 2006) 
 
 
For the CO2 price, there are no reliable long-term data available for calibration, 
obviously. There is only one established carbon market so far, which is the European 
Trading Scheme and prices have not been stable throughout the beginning phase. 
However, there are multiple sources using scenario analysis to produce a range of 
forecasts for future emission paths and they also compute the corresponding GHG 
shadow prices. One example is the GGI Scenario Database (IIASA, 2007). We can use 
the trend implied for GHG shadow prices. For the volatility parameter, it is possible to 
base the estimate on the spread of the different scenarios involved. Figure 1 below shows 
the forecasts and trend lines for three scenarios, where A2r (yellow) is the most 
pessimistic one in terms of assumptions about population growth, technological progress, 
diffusion of efficient technology and many other factors. B1 (red) is the most optimistic 
scenario and B2 (blue) is in the middle of the former two. All scenarios are computed for 
a stabilization target of 670ppm and we choose B2 for our starting price. The trend is 
almost 5% for all three scenarios. A value of 5% for the escalation rate would also be 
supported by a Hotelling solution, where the trend would be equal to the discount rate if 
there is banking and perfect foresight.
7 
 
                                                 
7 This result is valid as long as allocation in the future is more “tight” than in the beginning of the 
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Figure 1: GHG Shadow Prices (Source: GGI Scenario Database, IIASA, 2007) 
 
 
As mentioned above, there is no good “forecast” for carbon prices. There are several 
political factors and uncertainties like undefined future policy: what emission target the 
developed world commits to in the future, to what extent developing countries adopt 
emission targets, what rules are negotiated for offsets etc. In addition, there are several 
economic factors like uncertainties in BAU emissions, unknown patterns of abatement 
cost reductions as a result of learning processes, uncertainty about allocation mechanisms 
depending on policy proposals etc.  
The best we can do is to consider the variance across different scenarios, like 
those depicted in Figure 1 of the MIT EPPA model, which is reproduced below as Figure 
2 (Paltsev et al (2007), page 10).  These scenarios represent different assumptions 
regarding unknown factors that we take as given. Exclusion of outliers leads to 
conservative estimates of the spread around 30-40% of the mean. In that case annualized 
volatility is about 5%.
8  
 
                                                 
8 Sensitivity analysis demonstrates that for 
c σ from 0 to 6% the results are rather stable. Beyond these 
values, the number of REDD options purchased and the frequency of adding CCS decreases slightly until 
c σ =10%. Beyond 10%, 
c σ  becomes too large and the number of REDD options purchased falls to zero, 
as explained before. This is related to the fact that the CCS module offers more flexibility in that case, since 
it can be build during the planning horizon, whereas the REDD options are bought in the beginning. Note 
also that the price of the REDD option is a function of volatility: the higher the volatility, the higher the 
price. When price is too high, the REDD option becomes less attractive. This helps to explain the result of 
the sensitivity analysis. At the same time, the strike price is an important determinant of the option price. 
Developed and developing countries can always negotiate a strike price ensuring to have the option price 
within the corridor they are aiming at: on one hand, to generate enough money to cover the opportunity cost 
of avoided deforestation and, on another hand, to be attractive for purchases as part of a hedging strategy.   - 9 -
 
Figure 2: Scenarios of Allowance Allocation of Congressional Bills & Core Cases over 
Time (Source: Paltsev et al (2007), Figure 3 on page 10) 
 
 
4 Results & Implications for REDD 
 
The model developed and calibrated in the previous section was solved and we have 
conducted 10,000 simulations of CO2 price paths in order to extract some statistics from 
the optimal solution. Figure 2 shows that in all 10,000 cases the CCS module is added to 
the coal-fired power plant, as long as the price of acquiring a REDD option does not fall 
below 2 $/ton. For 1 $/ton the investment frequency drops by about 25%, and below 1 
$/ton, the CCS module is almost never adopted. The message from this result is that 
energy investments could indeed be negatively affected by the availability of cheap 
REDD options, but this depends on the pricing of the option in a framework like ours: if 
REDD is included in existing carbon markets and options on REDD are sold, where these 
options are priced as derivatives of the permits, then the resulting price is sufficiently 
high to still allow for investment into new technology, here CCS. On the other hand, if 
the price of a REDD would be equal to what the cost would be in a segmented market 
(according to existing carbon supply curves), then this price could be too low and reduce 
the investment frequency into carbon-saving technology, thus undermining the 
mechanism if the cap-and-trade scheme. This difference has been indicated by labeling 
the corresponding price levels with tags in Figure 3.
9  
 
                                                 
9 Testing these results for robustness with respect to permit price volatility, we find that the results are 
stable for volatility parameter values below 10%.   - 10 -
 
 
Figure 3: Number of REDD Options Bought & CCS Investment Frequency 
 
The left y-axis of Figure 3 measures the amount of REDD options, which are bought in 
the beginning of the planning period and which can be exercised at a given strike price of 
15$/ton of CO2 at a later point in time when there is demand for offsetting emissions. It 
can be seen that there is a negative relationship between the number of REDD options 
purchased and their option price. Obviously, a very low option price will make the way 
of offsetting via REDD more attractive compared to CCS investment, where larger sums 
have to be committed to achieve a reduction in CO2. This attractiveness diminishes, 
however, as the option price increases. For a price of 8$ or higher, the CCS module 
becomes the less expensive solution and zero offset options are bought in the beginning. 
An option price around $2/t CO2 will not harm CCS investment and will instead be likely 
to generate part of the upfront investment funds needed to start prevention of 
deforestation. 
  Now that we have investigated the general impact on the investment decision and 
the decision on the amount of REDD options bought, we are also interested in a more 
detailed analysis of the situation of the producer. Therefore, profit distributions have been 
computed for the case where the REDD options can be bought and for the case where 
they are not available. Figure 4 shows that the inclusion of REDD in the carbon market 
where permits are traded indeed has a positive effect on profits: even though the average 
level of profits remains unchanged, the associated risk decreases. This result can be 
confirmed for three risk measures: the variance, the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the 
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR).
10 
                                                 
10 The β-VaR of a portfolio is the lowest amount α such that, with probability β, the portfolio loss will not 
exceed α, whereas the β-CVaR is the conditional expectation of losses above that amount α, where β is a   - 11 -
 
Figure 4: Profit Distributions with (green) and without (red) REDD 
 
The numbers in Figure 4 can be interpreted as follows: with a probability of 95%, the 
producer can be sure that the profits will exceed the VaR value, i.e. the higher the VaR, 
the lower the risk. A similar argument holds for CVaR, which is not about the amount at 
risk at the 95% threshold, but the conditional expectation of that amount. This makes 
CVaR a suitable risk measure when distributions have fat tails, which can be the case 
with loss distributions when there can be catastrophic events, for example. In the case at 
hand, the distributions have a relatively normal shape, so the variance is also an 
informative risk measure. It is obvious that the variance is larger in the optimization 
without REDD options, so all three risk measures indeed confirm that including REDD 
helps producers hedge price spikes in permit prices and thus reduce their exposure to 
risk.
11 REDD is thus complementary to permit trading rather than undermining it, as long 
as the options are priced in the same framework, i.e. not sold at too low a price.  
 
5 Conclusion & Policy Recommendation 
 
This paper has presented a real options model where there are two ways to reduce 
emissions from ongoing operations of a coal-fired power plant in the face of a rising 
carbon price based on permit trading. On the one hand, the producer can decide to retrofit 
the plant and add a carbon capture module, which will dampen the amount of CO2 
                                                                                                                                                 
specified probability level. For a more precise definition and an introduction to optimization problems 
using CVaR see Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000, 2002). 
11 These results also point to the potential usefulness of a portfolio approach to these issues, but such 
considerations are beyond the scope of this paper and will thus be postponed for future research.   - 12 -
generated by the combustion of coal considerably (see Table 1). On the other hand, CO2 
credits can be purchased in the beginning of the planning period, which can serve as 
offsets for emissions at a later point in time. We suggest that such REDD credits should 
be regarded as options, where the buyer acquires the right, but not the obligation to offset 
emissions at a given strike price in the future. In this framework we have investigated 
some questions central to the current debate on REDD, its mechanisms and 
implementation - the most important one obviously being the potentially negative impact 
that the availability of cheap REDD credits could have on investment in new and less 
carbon-intensive (or even carbon-saving in the case of CCS) technology.  
  The analysis has shown that there are no negative consequences of including 
REDD for energy investments. This result hinges on the pricing of the REDD options, 
however. Some estimates for carbon supply curves find prices as low as 5$ per ton of 
carbon from marginal cost calculations, which would reduce the frequency of retrofitting 
the coal-fired power plant with CCS by about 25% in our framework. However, if the 
REDD options are priced as CO2 permit derivatives, the price will be sufficiently high, so 
as not to distort incentives to add CCS. This implies that the inclusion of REDD into 
existing carbon markets does not undermine the goals of cap-and-trade, as the necessary 
investments in new technology will still be triggered 100% of the time (see Figure 3). 
Only for very low option prices, REDD will be the more attractive alternative to reduce 
emissions and thus affect energy investments negatively. 
  In addition, we have investigated the effects on the producer’s ongoing operations 
in more detail. This has led to the finding that the average level of profits remains 
unchanged, but at the same time the risk associated with profit volatility is substantially 
lower if REDD is made available. Three risk measures have been used (variance, VaR, 
CVaR) and all three suggest that REDD options help the producer in smoothing out 
fluctuations arising from permit trading (see Figure 4). Therefore, REDD represents a 
source of flexibility to the producer or the investor, which is comparable to other forms of 
flexibility allowing for a costly decision to be postponed until better information becomes 
available. Bosetti and Lubowski, for example, investigate the effects of linking REDD 
with existing carbon markets in an integrated assessment model, where they compare 
scenarios where banking of permits is allowed to scenarios without banking. They show 
that banking provides a sort of flexibility that removes any negative effects of REDD on 
innovation and even enhances investments in that area (cross reference to Bosetti and 
Lubowski, 2009). Cap-and-trade and REDD are thus complementary and should be 
considered in one and the same market to ensure stability and avoid distortion of 
incentives.  
  Interpreting these results in a policy-context, it is important to note that there is 
not only investment irreversibility in terms of sunk costs for new technology involved in 
this optimization problem, but that there is also environmental irreversibility concerning 
deforestation: deforestation is an irreversible process in the short run and it kills the 
option to make a better-informed decision in the future. By committing relatively little 
resources now to keeping the option to offset emissions through avoided deforestation 
open for later, much can be gained in terms of flexibility and risks can be reduced – not 
only at the individual but also on the aggregate level if the analysis is extended to regions 
or countries or the world. Current computations about costs and benefits of including 
REDD should explicitly assign a value to this flexibility or account for the cost of   - 13 -
eliminating the flexibility by not slowing down deforestation rates. And finally, the 
uncertainty about unresolved issues with respect to the mechanisms, pricing schemes and 
political framework of REDD should not forestall its implementation in the near future 
and – more precisely, its integration into the next agreement following the end of the 
Kyoto period after 2012. The analysis in this paper has shown that treating REDD as an 
option and keeping that option open is valuable and that the final decision about its 
exertion can still be made at a later point in time in the light of more complete 
information. If resolving issues that are currently unclear in the future reveals that REDD 
is not needed, then the option does not need to be exercised and the strike price does not 
need to be incurred. If it turns out that REDD is necessary to meet the stabilization target, 
the option to do so will still be available and the target can be still be reached (and with 
much certainty at a lower cost than without). 
With respect to implementation issues, numerical simulations demonstrate the 
feasibility of a mutually beneficial agreement on REDD. There are several “moving” 
parts in the climate negotiations puzzle, which may be more easily solved step by step. 
According to an EDF-WHRC study (Nepstad et al, 2007), the opportunity cost of avoided 
deforestation is around $2 per ton of carbon to prevent up to 95% of all deforestation. 
This is negligibly small compared to all available estimates of allowance prices at a 
carbon market. However, due to scale effects, the required capital inflow is of sizable 
(see Golub and Greenberg, 2009). These investments are vitally important to save 
tropical forests. The option approach allows raising those funds first and solving other 
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Appendix: Solving the Real Options Model 
 
The problem underlying our real options model is essentially an optimum control 
problem, where the actions (do nothing, install the CCS module, buy a certain number of 
REDD options and exercise them) are the controls and the target to be maximized is the 
power plant operator’s (or the investor’s) profit. Let us first remember the Bellman 




As has been explained before, the Bellman equation consists of the immediate profits, but 
also of the discounted, expected continuation value, which takes into account all value of 
the function that materialize at a later point in time for all different realizations of the 
carbon price and all possible states, if the power plant owner would not have committed 
his resources to the installation of the carbon capture and storage module. While it is 
clear how the first part (the immediate profits,  ) P , a ,  x , (n
c
t t t t π ) should be valued, the 




1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t
r
+ + + +
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computed. In fact, we do not compute the continuation value, but we estimate it – a 
procedure, which gives us the same results as other methods, but which is much less 
time-consuming and more flexible for experiments and marginal changes to the model.  
In particular, we first discretize the carbon price, i.e. we have a grid for all 
possible realizations of the price between a predefined minimum and maximum, so that 
95% of the possible price paths lie within the grid. Then we use dynamic programming, 
fixing a terminal condition and finding the optimal action in each of the price nodes in the 
grid. So we end up with a sort of investment “recipe” for all values the price could have 
and for all the states the producer can be in. In the main text we have been referring to his 
“recipe” as a strategy.  
Then we use Monte Carlo simulation to simulate 10,000 price paths and “look up” 
in our “recipe” the optimal action. In this way we can derive the investment frequency 
distribution, the average timing of investment etc. The following diagram is adapted from 
Fuss et al (2008) and is supposed to visualize the method more clearly. 
The “ingredients” into the optimization are the stochastic process of the CO2 
permit price, which is at the same time used to price the REDD options, and the actions 
available to the power plant owner, namely whether to invest into the CCS module or not 
and whether to buy and exercise REDD options and how many (see first panel in the 
figure below). With the help of dynamic programming, the optimal action for each 
possible price realization and each potential state is found (upper right panel in the figure 
below). The arrows pointing at the initial node are dotted because the optimal actions 
found will hold also if the initial conditions are changed. The only fixed point needed to 
solve the problem is the terminal condition. For each price realization on the grid and 
each possible state, the optimal action is then stored in a matrix, from which the desired 
output can be extracted trough Monte Carlo simulation (lower right panel in the figure 
below. The last panel shows one output example, where the CCS investment frequency 
distribution for a simulation of 10,000 price paths is displayed.  
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